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1 Introduction 
The funding of long-term care is highly complex and involves a range of different funding 
sources and funding organisations. It is quite common for a person’s care needs to be 
simultaneously supported by funds from local councils, the benefits system, and their own 
income and savings. At present, public financial support is mostly subject to a detailed and 
complicated financial means-test, that assesses in depth applicants own financial situation. Once 
broad eligibility for financial support is determined, the amount of funding support that a 
person receives depends largely on the intensity and cost of the support they are assessed as 
needing. The latter is established after a detailed needs assessment. Moreover, the type of care 
that a person uses also affects the nature and level of funding support. There are at present, for 
example, separate funding rules for residential and non-residential care. The upshot is that 
overall older people end up paying a significant proportion – around a half – of total 
expenditure on social care out of pocket. 
Funding social care services is likely to become more difficult in to the future. Underlying 
demand for care is set to rise significantly as a result of the ageing population and trends in 
chronic diseases. The price per unit of care service has been and is likely to continue to rise 
faster than general inflation. Although there is perhaps scope to improve the use of resources, 
the pressure to find more money looks to be significant. These resources will need to be raised 
from public funds, from the pockets of individuals and their families, or both. 
A number of high profile reports have argued the case for reform of the current funding system, 
including the King’s Fund Wanless Social Care Review (Wanless et al., 2006) and an inquiry by 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2006). These reports promoted 
a commitment by Government to produce a Green Paper to investigate these issues.  
This report outlines the analytical work that was commissioned by the Department of Health to 
feed into the development of a Green Paper. It describes the methods and assumptions 
underlying the model used for analysing long-term funding systems. The paper gives details of 
potential and actual users of care, their levels of need, and their income and assets. It details the 
system of support available, the current funding arrangements and the benefits system. The 
report looks at costs and to the degree to which population need is being met. It concludes with 
an assessment of the current system.  
Three considerations are particularly salient when assessing the case for reforming the funding 
of long-term care. First, how does the reform affect the benefits or outcomes of the system for 
its stakeholders (e.g. service users, informal carers, service providers)? Second, what are its 
costs implications – for the public purse and for individuals? Third, what is the distribution of 
these costs and benefits across the population? In other words, who stands to gain and who to 
lose from any changes? 
The goal of the analysis is for these three considerations to be made in specific, quantifiable 
terms so that the size of changes can be assessed. This means not only determining the change 
in costs but also (and as far as possible) the changes in outcome. Importantly, these changes 
ought to be assessable at the individual person level as well as in aggregate terms, in order to 
assess the distributional effects of any reform. 
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2 The PSSRU micro-simulation model 
These analysis requirements outlined above can be met with a dynamic micro-simulation 
approach. Our simulation model takes basic data about the observed population of older people 
in England and applies the rules and features of the current social care and benefits systems to 
determine what amount of help people in different circumstances would get, how much they 
would pay and so forth. The model is built around key basic data, including details of people’s 
wealth, levels of need, rates of disability, health, housing tenure, household composition, socio-
economic characteristics, etc. Since this model is applied to a real (sampled) population, the 
total predicted service use, benefit uptake, costs etc. can be aggregated to achieve national 
estimates. Having built and calibrated this baseline model, we can then explore the 
consequences of alternative policy reforms by modelling changes to the rules and features of the 
modelled care and support system. 
The PSSRU dynamic micro-simulation (DMS) was developed from an earlier static micro-
simulation model used for the Wanless Social Care Review which reported in 2006. This 
Wanless model used the English Longitudinal Survey Ageing (ELSA) for baseline data and 
focused only on people over 65. Due to certain limitations with this data (and in particular the 
relatively small sample size that was available), a new model was developed using the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is a longitudinal survey that interviews the same 
people over time with replacement for people that drop out or die.  
2.1 Rationale for a dynamic micro-simulation model 
With a dynamic micro-simulation model in which people are ‘aged’ through time, we are able to 
understand the implications for individuals in society of alternative assumptions about key 
factors (e.g. rates of disability, people’s wealth, policy scenarios) in the present as well as 
through time, which allows the analysis to describe people’s ‘care paths’ in time.  
Dynamic micro-simulations allow the analysis of longitudinal aspects of policy, such as the 
phasing in of a new care and support system. We can for instance explore the effects of reforms 
which assume ‘transitional protection’ of existing arrangements, whereby only new service 
users from the point of implementation are treated under new arrangements, and pre-reform 
arrangements are applied to existing service users.  
A dynamic model is also especially useful for exploring the effect of funding systems on the 
possible draw-down of assets by service users, one of the central policy questions of the current 
care and support systems. A dynamic model allows us therefore to simulate how individuals’ 
assets are depleted, giving information on the profile of assets used over time. The issue of asset 
depletion is most relevant for the over 65 user group who (in contrast with younger disabled 
people) in the main accumulate significant assets by the time they become dependent. Younger 
disabled people are far less likely to hold significant assets that could be used to pay for care.  
Balancing the extra analytical benefits of a dynamic model against the significant additional 
development costs of such a model, we therefore decided to use a DMS only for the over 65 
client group. For under 65s the same baseline model was used but only a static micro-
simulation (SMS) version was used for the analysis. 
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2.2 Structure of the model 
At baseline (2007), the approach distinguishes the following types of data or variables. First, 
there is baseline characteristics data as provided by the BHPS survey: e.g. age, sex, baseline 
wealth, baseline need, etc. A second type are ‘policy-derived’ variables, such as the type and 
level of care and support consumed, the amount of state funding received, and the size of out of 
pocket charges paid. These derived factors are calculated in the model using: 
• rules and features of the care and support, benefits and tax systems (as laid down by 
current policy), and  
• assumptions about rules underpinning people’s behaviour, including estimates of how 
people adjust the amount of care they buy depending on the charges they face.  
In the dynamic model most derived variables are also related to their past values, so that for 
example, a person that was in a care home in the past would be more likely to be in a care home 
in the present. 
The sample used in the dynamic model is made-up at baseline of just under 30,000 people (over 
65), pooling data from waves 3 to 15 of the BHPS.1
Two versions of the DMS are used.  
 For any given year, the model estimates the 
care and support requirements associated with somebody’s circumstances. Dependency profiles 
are calculated on the basis on past health states and assumptions about present and future 
prevalence of disability (by age and gender). The level of care associated with different levels of 
need reflects broadly the average packages of care provided currently by local authorities, and 
depends on factors such as physical and mental health and the availability of informal support. 
The level of state funding provided varies depending on the resources of the person in need (i.e. 
income and assets) and the eligibility rules of the funding system assumed in the model. The 
impact on individuals wealth varies depending on the care contributions required of them. 
Individual people in the model are then aged by one year, and new levels of dependency, care 
support requirements and state and user funding contributions calculated. The probability of 
dying between periods in the model is estimated as a function of a person’s characteristics, 
including age, gender and health state. The overall probability of death was adjusted to ensure 
that the population in the model evolved in line with the 2006 GAD population projections.  
• The first has population replacement, that is, a new sub-sample of 65 year olds is added to 
the sample every new period. This number of new older people ‘borne’ to the model is 
set to produce the right size of over 65 population (net of those who died) as projected 
by the Government Actuaries Department (GAD). In this way, the model can be run 
indefinitely into the future with a representative cross-section of the older people 
population. However, since the projections about future populations become less and 
less reliable the further into the future we look, it was decided to run the model for 20 
years after baseline.  
• The second version of the model does not have replacement, and so no new cohorts of 65 
year olds are added every year. As a result, in this version of the model everybody in the 
sample has died approximately 42 years after the initial period. This version of the 
model is useful when we are only interested in seeing what happens to individual people 
rather than ongoing population totals. 
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People’s characteristic change as they age. If they survive from one year to the next, individuals 
in the sample can experience changes in their health condition, their marital status, living 
arrangements and in their income and wealth (independently of any effects of the care and 
support system). These changes through time are replicated in the model through a set of 
transition probabilities that, like the chance of death, govern how each person’s state through 
time. Transition probabilities are based on estimations of how these characteristics changed in 
the past (exploiting in particular the longitudinal nature of the BHPS) and assumptions about 
the future (e.g. interest on savings, capital gains or losses on assets etc.). Since most individual 
characteristics in the model are modified through time, transition probabilities are crucial to the 
results of the model because they affect the levels estimated of the derived variables through 
time.  
Box 1 lists the main variables in the DMS model, distinguishing characteristics and derived 
variables. As noted above, most characteristics variables are modified through time. Derived 
variables also change through time depending on how people’s characteristics variables change 
and also directly on the past values of the derived variables themselves. For example, we 
assume that people that receive Attendance Allowance in the previous year also claim in the 
current year. Current wealth is given by past wealth plus the net difference between current 
income (including returns on assets) and outlays (including care and non-care expenditure). 
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Box 1. Variables in the model 




• Health/disability state 
• Household composition and Tenure 
• Marital status 
• Availability of informal care by a surviving co-habitants (e.g. spouses) and by people 
living outside the person's home (e.g. grown-up children) 
• Gross income sources and baseline assets (before care costs)  
• Benefits (other than Pension Credit/Income Support and DLA/AA) 
• Unit costs of services (including breakdown of care and housing costs) 
Modified through time: 
• Survival/death 
• Age 
• Disability state 
• Housing composition – whether the person lives alone 
• Marital status 
• Informal care by co-habitants and by people living outside the person's home 
• Unit costs of services (including breakdown of care and housing costs) 
Derived variables# 
• Derived benefits uptake – AA/DLA and Pension Credit – and expenditure on benefits* 
• Total housing and non-housing assets at the individual level (including savings and 
draw-down of assets)* 
• Need and assessment (FAC levels)* 
• Informal care use* 
• Service use and intensity: residential and non-residential; privately arranged and 
publicly-supported* 
• Cost of service use: privately purchased (care and housing); cost of care top-ups on 
public care packages; public supported care and housing costs. 
• Charges to individuals: private care fees, care top-ups payments, housing charges, 
charges made to the public system 
• Net public spend in above categories 
• Unmet need 
• Net income and housing- and non-housing wealth (given care costs to individuals)* 
# These are variables that are directly depend on the set-up of the care system and would therefore be 
affected by any reform of the care system  
* These variables depend on prevailing characteristics variables and past (or ‘lagged’) values of that 
variable.  
6  PSSRU Discussion Paper 2644 
3 Characteristics of the population 
The main characteristics variables were determined at baseline and changed through time as 
follows. As outlined above, the model is either run for 20 years or until the baseline population 
cohort are all dead (for 42 years). For our purposes, we particularly identify the baseline year, 
the financial year ending 2007, the current period (FY to 2010) and also five years later (FY to 
2015). As a shorthand, the convention in this report is that when a date is mentioned e.g. 2015, 
this means financial year ending 2015.   
3.1 Age and gender 
These variables were as given directly by the BHPS sample. Gender does not change through 
time and age changes on a yearly basis. 
3.2 Mortality and need 
3.2.1 Survival 
Probabilities of death by age and gender are taken from GAD 2006 principle population 
projections, which provide the model with targets for yearly changes in 1-year-age and sex 
population groups. The model also reflects, however, that not all people within each age-sex 
group are equally likely to die. We generate a continuous mortality-risk severity score based on 
people’s disability and need, their age and sex, their time spent in care and, importantly, a 
random component, on the basis of the results of survival models estimated from BHPS data. 
Based on these scores, individuals in the sample are ranked in terms of their estimated 
mortality risk (within their respective age and sex group). The required target number of deaths 
within each age/gender group is then achieved by eliminating first those individuals with the 
highest risk scores.  
To counter very small sample size numbers at the extreme right tail of the age distribution, we 
truncate the age distribution so that no-one survives past 107 years. 
This method ensures that the total numbers in the sample (weighted to the England total 65+ 
population level) who survive corresponds to the published GAD population tables. However, 
the likelihood of dying in each age-sex group is also dependent on people’s prevailing health (as 
indicated by their stated disability).  
Life expectancy at 65 years old in the model (measured from the base year 2006/7) is given in 
Table 1 and the full distribution is given in Figure 1. 
Table 1. Life expectancy at 65 
 Mean Median 
Female 22.9 24 
Male 20.5 21 
All 21.7 22 
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Figure 1. Life expectancy at 65, by sex 
 
3.2.2 Needs 
A standard measure of a person’s impairment (and hence need) is their ability to carry out 
activities of daily living (ADLs), such as dressing, feeding, walking and also ‘instrumental’ 
activities such as shopping and cleaning. The BHPS reports a variety of activity of daily living 
(ADL) problems that people experience and also whether people regard themselves as having 
long-standing illnesses that limit their usual activities.  
While the BHPS uses a subset of ADL indicators, including dressing, walking and housework, the 
English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) has a more detailed list. In order to achieve a finer 
distinction of disability levels amongst the population in the model, we used the relationship 
found between ADLs, age, gender and limiting long-standing illness (LLSI) in the ELSA survey to 
impute a 0 to 5 count of ADLs in the BHPS sample. This indicator is used as the main disability 
indicator, and is referred to as the person’s ADL need level. We used previous service usage to 
improve the ADL count need measure. A count of ADL problems of this type has shown itself to 
be a good indicator of need as it relates to the use of social care (Wanless et al., 2006). 
The disability measure therefore has six states (ranging from no problems to five ADL 
problems); their disability/need state can go up and down through time.  
A key element of the modelling process is the assumption made about the extent to which the 
prevalence of disability among older people will change in the future. Following our previous 
work (Wanless et al., 2006), we assume constant age-sex prevalence of each need level in the 
population. This scenario approximates the case where falling incidence rates of chronic disease 
are offset by increasing life expectancy. In the same way as the mortality calculations, we 
estimate a target number of people in each of the six states. The dependency level for people in 
the sample is assumed to depend on their previous need level (the higher a person’s previous 
need level, the greater their chance of being in a high need level for the current period, other 
things equal), their age and sex. In particular, we calculate a continuous need severity score for 
each person based on their previous need level, age, sex and a random component in each five 
year-age and sex band. People are then allocated to each of the six need levels in rank order of 
their severity score (the most severe in the highest bands) until the required number of people 
at each need level is reached for each 5-year age and sex group. This approach means that 
people with the highest risk of need are in the highest ADL need levels but that the total 
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proportions of people with need in the population is held constant (within the year-sex groups). 
The dependency transition probabilities between years were also calibrated on the basis of 
observed transitions in the BHPS sample. 
Figure 2 shows the size of the population in each of three categories of ADL need: none, low 
(one or two ADL problems) and high (three or more ADL problems). In keeping with the 
constant prevalence assumption, the proportion of the population in each category changes 
little through time.   
Figure 2. Population by ADL need level, and percentage high ADL need, 2009–2026 
 
The link between ADL need and mortality is strong. Table 2 shows the population in the model 
five years from now (2014/15) in each need group. The proportions remain largely constant 
through time as noted above. The table also shows the population in the model in their last year 
of life i.e. who die before the start of the next year. This population is predominantly in the high 
need category. With the assumptions made in the model, we see a mortality rate of nearly 25% 
for the high need group, falling to just 0.3% of the population dying for the no ADL needs group. 
For low needs people the mortality rate is much lower. A small proportion of people die 
relatively suddenly having not suffered a chronic condition before death. 
Table 2. Need and mortality, 2014/15 
ADL 
need 
Total population (65+) Population (65+) in 
last year of life 
Mortality 
rate (%) 
 N Per cent N Per cent  
None 6,763,000 70 22,000 6 0.3 
Low 1,965,000 20 96,000 26 4.9 
High 1,002,000 10 246,000 68 24.6 
All 9,730,000 100 364,000 100 3.7 
 
Healthy life expectancy can be defined as the years from 65 until a person develops a care need. 
In this case we focus on the time before someone develops a high ADL need. Table 3 shows the 
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years until the first period of high need for all people at 65 and then for only those people that 
suffer high need before death. The table also shows the number of years people are free of high 
need. This number is higher than the equivalent years to high need because some people 
recover to lower levels of need for a time. 
Table 3. Healthy life expectancy (at 65) 
 
All people (65) 
Only people (65) that 
develop some need before 
death 
All people (65) 
 Years to 
high need 
Number 
Years to high 
need 
Number 
Years free of 
high need 
Number 
Female 17.4 239000 15.8 164000 19.6 239000 
Male 17.2 225000 15.8 110000 18.6 225000 
All 17.3 464000 15.8 274000 19.1 464000 
 
The central assumptions in the model mean that around 60% of 65s go on to develop some 
episode of high need before they die (70% for females, 50% for males).   
3.3 Household composition, marital status and informal care 
Whether a person lives alone and their marital status is sampled directly in the BHPS at 
baseline. A little over 35% of the older population live alone at baseline, and nearly 55% are 
married (including cohabiting). Informal care giving from identified household inhabitants to 
other members of the household is also recorded and allows the calculation of whether people 
receive informal care from co-habitants and the intensity of that care input. Informal care by 
people living outside the home was imputed using data from ELSA.  
The change in informal care receipt through time is based on an estimation using BHPS of 
current year informal care on previous year informal care receipt and also on marital status and 
need level. The results give the likelihood that a person’s state will change year-on-year from 
informal care receipt to non-receipt and vice versa. A randomiser is used with these 
probabilities to select which people changed state. This method is relatively straightforward to 
apply and works well for binary states (i.e. informal care or not). Table 4 shows that this 
method produces largely constant proportions of people with need in receipt of informal care 
through time. 
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Table 4. Informal care receipt – people with some ADL need 
 
A similar method was used to determine whether for married people, their marital status 
changed through time. The main cause in this case is death of a spouse but can also be as a 
result of divorce. For simplicity among this age group we do not allow for people who are not 
married at baseline to become ‘married’. For people living only with a spouse, a change in 
marital status automatically means that they are living alone from that time onwards. For 
people living with more than one other person, we assume that situation persists until they die. 
People living alone at baseline stay living alone until they die. These central assumption results 
in a largely constant proportion of the older population both living alone and being married at 
any given time. 
4 Model outputs: derived variables 
The derived variables fall into three categories: benefits variables, need variables and care 
service variables.  
4.1 Benefits 
The BHPS asks people about whether they claim Pension Credit and/or Income Support and the 
amount they receive. These are critical variables because they are key elements in the means-
testing rules that determine the amount of financial support that people receive towards their 
social care. To be able to explore uptake rates of these benefits and to look at how they interact 
with the social care system, in the model we apply the Pension Credit rules to people’s 
circumstances to determine directly how much benefit each person receives (including zero 
benefit). In particular, this allows us to model the increase in uptake rates that occurs for people 
subject to means-testing for social care. 
Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) are universal benefits that 
provide disabled people with additional income (see section 8.1.2 below for further details). 
Uptake of these benefits is also derived in the model. The BHPS records use of these benefits 
and we use this data to predict (using regression analysis) people’s likelihood of claiming these 
benefits at baseline. The predicting factors are: need (activities of daily living count and limiting 
long-standing illness), age, gender, income and (non-housing) assets. This approach is used to 
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ensure that AA and DLA uptake and spend correspond to published levels for these benefits. 
This correspondence is important because reform of the care and support system could include 
changes in spending on these benefits. 
For estimates of future values of these disability benefits (i.e. after the baseline) we use a 
constant age-sex-need prevalence approach. In other words, the proportion of people claiming 
these benefits within each population grouping by age, sex and need remains constant through 
time. For Attendance Allowance, each year recipients will be those people that were in receipt 
last year plus new recipients in each population group required to maintain a constant 
prevalence. For DLA constant prevalence is maintained in new 65 year olds, with people over 65 
continuing to receive this benefit if they were already in receipt (DLA cannot be newly claimed 
for people over 65 – who seek AA instead – but current recipients can continue after 65). For 
both AA and DLA, people in receipt in the past remain in receipt until they die. 
Table 5 shows the numbers of people claiming AA and DLA (care) projected in the model. Also 
reported is the number of new AA claimants in that year (i.e. people that did not claim in the 
previous year). Approximately 20% of current AA claimants are new claimants in that year. 
Overall, about 14.5% of the older population are in receipt of AA in any given year. 
Table 5. Uptake of Attendance Allowance and Disability Living Allowance (care) in older population 
 
The mean duration of receipt of AA for people from 65 to death is around 6.5 years in the model, 
with a median of five years. Figure 3 shows the distribution of durations in receipt. In the model 
just over 63% of people at 65 will go on to claim AA for at least some time before they die (this 
lifetime risk can be compared to the yearly prevalence of AA recipients of around 14.5% of the 
older population).  
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Figure 3. Numbers of 65 year olds, by time in receipt of Attendance Allowance 
 
As noted above, (ADL) need is a strong risk factor in explaining the receipt of AA. The results of 
the regression modelling on the BHPS sample show that people with low and high need are 
much more likely to be in receipt than people with no reported need. On the other hand, the 
data do nonetheless suggest that people with zero reported ADL need do have a small but not 
negligible chance of being in receipt. Moreover, since the population size in this zero ADL group 
is comparatively very high, the totals numbers of recipients in any given year with zero 
reported ADL need is relatively large. Figure 4 shows uptake (the bars) and recipient numbers 
(the line) for 2009/10 for people by ADL need.  
Figure 4. AA uptake rate and numbers in receipt, by ADL need (ADL count), 2009/10 
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Figure 5 reports the analysis of the relationship between AA uptake and (pre-benefit) income. 
Two relationships are shown – one accounting for the (inverse) relationship between income 
and need and the other without this adjustment. Both analyses indicate that wealthier people 
are less likely to claim AA than poorer people, but also that very wealthy people still show a 
significant propensity to claim (at over a 10% rate compared to the whole population average of 
14.5%). 
Figure 5. AA uptake rate, by income deciles, 2009/10 
 
4.2 Assets and income 
Home ownership rates and the value of housing assets are given for the baseline year according 
to the values in BHPS and calibrated with data from the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing 
(ELSA). Non-housing assets are determined in the same way. For new people (65 year olds) 
entering the sample in future years, both housing and non-housing assets are assumed to be 2% 
higher in real terms than 65s in the previous year. For people ageing in the sample after the 
base year, the following processes affect the size of asset values.  
• First, spend-down of assets where spending in that year to meet care costs and other 
costs-of-living exceeds income.  
• Second, savings from any remaining income (after costs) are calculated at a rate given by 
analysis of the BHPS. These are added to the current non-housing assets total and accrue 
a 2% real rate of return.  
• Third, capital gains accrue to remaining housing assets (also at a rate of 2% real).  
• Fourth, people are assumed to make non-care-related draw-downs of assets at a rate of 
approximately 5% per year (although it is modelled in a non-continuous way).  
These processes were specified to produce a profile of asset holding that matches people in the 
BHPS. The rate of change in these processes is assumed to be constant through time.  
The PSSRU microsimulation modelling distinguishes benefits income, pension incomes and 
other incomes. For new 65s in the sample, all income is assumed to be 2% higher in real terms 
than 65 year olds in the previous year (analogous with the treatment of assets). For people 
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ageing in the sample after 65, income related benefits income (i.e. Pension Credit) is assumed to 
increase by 2% (in line with increases in earnings). Disability related benefits are assumed to 
remain constant in real terms. All other benefits increase at 2%. Pension income is also assumed 
to increase at 2% real (from 2007 as a simplifying assumption, rather than from 2012). 
Earnings income is assumed to fall (by an average of 5% per year to reflect older people 
dropping out of the workforce). All other sources of income are assumed to remain constant. 
4.2.1 Assets 
Non-housing assets include all forms of savings and assets other than the person’s own home. 
For example, they include other properties, cars, personal wealth such as valuables and all 
forms of savings (bank accounts through to stocks and shares). Housing assets are the value of 
people’s own home (domicile property). For the analysis we calculate the assets of either 
individual people – where people live alone or do not live with a recognised partner – and the 
assets of couples divided equally between the two people. This latter specification therefore 
creates a pseudo-individual level asset total for couples. The rationale is that the social care 
means-test treats the assets of a married (or legally partnered) person needing care as equal to 
half the couple’s total asset holding. In actuality, married people tend to hold assets in both 
individual and dual names. Furthermore, the head of the household (usually the man) holds a 
higher value of individual assets than the spouse. The result is that the sum of individual and 
shared dual-named assets is greater for men than for women. In practice, disentangling asset 
ownership is difficult and so the half-of-total rule for couples is a useful convenience. In any 
case, taking an average of asset holdings of individuals calculated in this way provides the same 
number as the average of actual individual level holdings when taken over the whole 65 
population.  
The value of assets is extremely skewed (in the BHPS and other surveys), with the richest 10% 
of people in the asset distribution holding more than half of the total asset value of the whole 
(over 65) population. Table 6 reports the mean and median level of non-housing assets of 
people in the whole population, and by ADL need group. The median holding is £8700 per 
individual ( a far more meaningful number given in skew) with the mean at £35600. People in 
high need groups have significantly fewer assets than people without disabilities. 
Table 6. Non-housing assets (2009/10),  
by need group, whole population 
Need group Mean (£s) Median (£s) 
None 38000 10100 
Low 30200 6800 
High 30600 5600 
All 35600 8700 
 
The skewed nature of the asset holdings is demonstrated in Table 7, which shows the average 
level of non-housing wealth for ten groups of people ranked from lowest to highest wealth. 
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Table 7. Non-housing assets (2009/10),  
by NH wealth decile, whole population 












Figure 6 shows the change in non-housing wealth of people at 65 through time. Non-housing 
wealth is not shown for all age groups because it will be affected by the nature of the care and 
support system that is in place. Although not constant, this trend increases by an average of 2% 
in real terms between 2010 and 2026 (a 37% increase). The increase in the median level is 
slightly higher at 46% over the period.  
Figure 6. Non-housing wealth (per individual) – various years, population at 65 and all older population 
 
4.2.2 Income 
Net (total) income (i.e. gross income less any taxes) of older people in the model in 2009/10 is 
estimated to have a mean of £230 p.w. and a median of £200 p.w. Net income includes pensions, 
benefits, work, asset return and other income. Two sets of benefits are particularly relevant for 
older people with care needs – Pension Credit and disability-related benefits such as Attendance 
Allowance. Table 8 reports net income and also net non-benefit income which is net total 
income less pension credit and disability-related benefits (but not other benefits). Before these 
benefits, net income is lower for people with higher needs. However, higher needs people are 
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also more likely to qualify for and claim high levels of pension credit (especially the severe 
disability premium) and disability-related benefits. Our estimates suggest that these benefits 
are sufficient to restore some equality of income between the needs groups in the population.  
 
Table 8. Net total and net non-benefit income per week, 2010, by need 
 Net (total) income Net non-benefit income 
Need Mean Median Mean Median 
None 230 190 220 190 
Low 230 200 200 170 
High 230 210 180 160 
All 230 200 210 180 
 
The income of people over 65 (as represented by the people in the model’s BHPS sample) is also 
skewed. Table 9 shows net income by income quintiles. Pension Credit (in particular) and 
disability-related benefit income is higher for the lower income quintiles.  
 
Table 9. Net income per week – by income quintile (2010), total and non-benefit 
Income 
quintile 
Net total income (£ p.w.) Net non-benefit income (£s p.w.) 
Min Mean Max Mean 
Difference between total 
and non-benefit (%) 
1 0 100 130 70 30 
2 130 150 170 130 13 
3 170 200 220 180 10 
4 220 250 300 240 4 
5 300 450 8130 440 2 
 
Figure 7 shows the change in net income of new 65 year olds into the model on central 
assumptions regarding the future. In this case, the increase in incomes averages around 2% per 
year. The mean net income of people at 65 in 2010 is slightly higher (at £250 than the over 65 
population mean). 
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Figure 7. Net income, 2010–2026, mean and median – for 65 year olds 
 
Where the care and support system is means-tested (as it is to a substantial extent at present), 
people’s pre-care income and assets are an important determinant of how much financial 
support that people receive. In turn, however, the resultant charges that people pay for care and 
support will influence how they have to draw on assets (given their income) which will affect 
their eligibility for financial support from the public system in the future. Developing care needs 
that entitle people to claim Attendance Allowance also gives them an entitlement, generally 
speaking, to enhanced levels of Pension Credit. Overall, the long-term (i.e. lifetime) impact of 
care costs on (residual expenditure) and assets is a highly relevant part of any assessment of the 
reform of the care and support system (see section 9.3 below). 
4.3 Care service utilisation 
The amount of service and support any individual person actually uses in the care system will 
depend on their assessed level of need and two ‘tests’: a needs-test and a financial means-test. 
The assessment is based on professional practice but the needs- and financial- tests are 
mechanisms to ensure that public expenditure falls within budget. The needs-test at present 
controls expenditure by limiting access to the public system. Each person is assessed to 
determine their level of need. Councils then set a needs-eligibility threshold; people with needs 
assessed at below this threshold do not receive support. The financial test depends on the 
funding arrangements in the system. We consider these in detail in section 8, but here we can 
think of the test as (a) limiting support to people with low levels of wealth and (b), by levying a 
charge on people, limiting public expenditure and also giving people who face charges an 
incentive to delay or reduce their service use.  
In the model these steps are disaggregated. We calculate the basic amount of support, which is 
determined only according to people’s needs. After applying the needs test, we determine a 
potential amount of care and support for each person. The public system care offer is the 
amount of support after applying the needs test and any exclusions for public support specified 
in the financial test. The financial test will also specify care charges. The actual use of services is 
determined after allowing for the response of individuals to charges.  
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4.4 Need 
4.4.1 Assessing need 
Current practice in social care is guided by the DH Fair Access to Care (FAC) framework 
(Department of Health, 2002). The framework defines 4 categories of need or FAC levels: critical, 
substantial, moderate and low. People are assessed and placed into one of these 4 levels (or no 
needs). These levels are then used as a basis for allocating resources as outlined below. The 
model uses data on the uptake of publicly-funded services using BHPS, the Health Survey for 
England (HSE) and the General Household Survey (GHS) to estimate FAC levels as derived from 
ADL need, age and access to informal care (especially from cohabiting carers).   
Table 10 reports the numbers of people in the model that fall into each FAC level, as based on 
their severity of impairment, but before any consideration of their informal care situation (using 
the regression modelling results).  
Table 10. Fair Access to Care groups  
(before informal care considerations), 2010 




Low or none 6,762,000 
 
The correlation between ADL need (measuring impairment) and assessed FAC level is high as 
we would expect – see Table 11. 




Critical Substantial Moderate Low (or 
none) 
1 0% 0% 23% 92% 
2 3% 50% 72% 8% 
3 24% 40% 4% 0% 
4 36% 10% 0% 0% 
5 38% 0% 0% 0% 
Any 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The availability of informal care has an important impact on the numbers of people who have 
any potential need for formal care services. Informal care effects work in two ways. Some 
people with impairment will have high levels of informal support and so would not approach 
social services. Some others might be formally assessed but their FAC need would be reduced 
(in to the low or none category). We describe these as people with full informal care. Table 12 
gives the numbers of people in need when informal care is assessed. 
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Table 12. Fair Access to Care eligibility groups  







Low or none 7,330,000 
 
4.4.2 Needs assessed levels of support and unit costs 
We can directly map between a person’s level of need and the amount of care they would 
(hypothetically) receive under the current system in the absence of resource constraints. The 
model distinguishes between care home and community-based services at this stage. It defines a 
need for a care home placement based on analysis of relevant risk factors, including ADL need, 
age and living arrangements. In the main, potential care home residents are the most dependent 
(e.g. around 80% are in the critical FAC band). 
We use a simplified model of care home placements in the model in that the costs of a care home 
package are assumed to be the same for all people. These costs include both hotel costs and care 
costs. Table 13 gives the costs of care home placements per week (including care and hotel 
element) and also the hotel charge separately. For example, total care home costs in 2009/10 
were £500 per week including £267 hotel costs. The distinction is important because different 
care and support funding systems might wish to treat housing costs in care homes in an 
equivalent way as housing costs that people face in their own homes (Wanless et al., 2006).  
The table also gives the unit cost of community care services as measured in units of an hour of 
contact time or equivalent.  
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Table 13. Unit costs of services 
Year Care home charge 
£ per week 
Hotel charge 
£ per week 
Community care 
£ per hour 
2010 499.8 266.7 15.2 
2011 509.8 272.0 15.5 
2012 520.0 277.4 15.8 
2013 530.4 283.0 16.1 
2014 541.0 288.6 16.4 
2015 551.8 294.4 16.7 
2016 562.9 300.3 17.1 
2017 574.1 306.3 17.4 
2018 585.6 312.4 17.8 
2019 597.3 318.7 18.1 
2020 609.2 325.0 18.5 
2021 621.4 331.5 18.8 
2022 633.8 338.1 19.2 
2023 646.5 344.9 19.6 
2024 659.4 351.8 20.0 
2025 672.6 358.8 20.4 
2026 686.1 366.0 20.8 
 
In assessing the total cost that an individual would have to pay for residential care we also need 
to know their length of stay in the home. Compared with establishing the total number of people 
in care homes at any given time, estimating how long over time different people stay in care 
homes is far more difficult. And yet, for individuals, length of stay is a source of considerable 
cost risk. A 10-year stay in a care home from 2010 in the model would cost £285,000, for 
example, and would obviously have serious implications for the spend-down of that person’s 
assets were they to be liable for the cost.  
The difficulty in estimating this number stems from the requirement to run long-term 
longitudinal research that follows people through time. We draw on PSSRU research as the best 
source but this is now becoming somewhat dated, whilst in the meantime the average level of 
dependency of people in care homes has increased with the corresponding likelihood that 
average length of stay will have fallen. The relevant assumptions in the model – based in this 
research – produce a mean length of stay of two years and a median length of stay of one year. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of care home residents by their lengths of stay.  
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Figure 8. Lengths of stay in care homes 
 
People that get community-based care (i.e. do not go into residential care) potentially receive a 
formal care package that varies according to their: ADL need, age, living alone (as a proxy for 
informal care), age, gender and whether the person has limiting long-standing illness. The first 
three factors are the main ones. Throughout the analysis we are concerned with inputs required 
for personal care needs. (Practical care needs – that may or may not be higher due to disability – 
are not covered – see Wanless et al., 2006) 
The size of the care package is assessed in community-care hour equivalent units per week and 
the unit costs in Table 13 above are applied to produce a community care package in cost per 
week terms. Table 14 gives the average weekly potential care packages in £s per week i.e. the 
amount regardless of FAC eligibility, budgetary or full informal care considerations. In essence 
this is a measure of a person’s need in cost-equivalent terms summarising the net effects of ADL 
need, living arrangements and age. For example, the mean package per week of someone with 
five ADLs, living alone and over 85 is £210 per week. Whilst this figure does not include people 
with full informal care (which reduces the formal care need to zero), it does reflect an informal 
care input that complements formal support that people might get from cohabitants. The 
amounts in the columns for people living alone can be interpreted as the total value of required 
caring inputs (under the current system), regardless of whether addressed through formal or 
informal support. We should also note that this is just the personal care element and that these 
are mean figures (and so hide substantial variation person-to-person). 
Table 14. Need-indicated community-based care inputs (mean) £s per week, 2010– 
by ADL need, living alone and over 85 
 Not Alone Alone 
ADL need Less than 85 Over 85 Less than 85 Over 85 
1 50 55 85 88 
2 59 65 99 102 
3 72 77 116 117 
4 98 103 152 153 
5 138 142 209 210 
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In addition, the model assesses whether people need one-off pieces of equipment, and these are 
valued at around £600 per year (equivalent) in the model. 
5 The needs test and the care ‘offer’  
The above amounts of formal care support are indicative levels only i.e. those levels of care that 
would be received if there were no overall budget constraints and all people with any disability 
received formal care support. In practice councils are budget constrained and therefore need a 
method for allocating support to people. To do this, councils set eligibility thresholds relative to 
the FAC levels described above such that people with needs that are greater than the threshold 
level are eligible for public-funded support (although they are then tested with regard to their 
financial means) (Forder, 2007). For example, many councils currently support people with 
critical or substantial needs. In the micro-simulation model, the eligibility threshold has two 
components: first which FAC levels are completely supported and then the proportion of people 
within the next lower level. At present, 100% of people in critical and substantial levels are 
eligible and also 33% of people in the moderate needs level.  
Eligibility thresholds are a form of needs test, which in this case, rules out lower-need people in 
the population from getting public support. It leaves the number of people that are FAC eligible 
and this number is estimated at 1.3 million in 2010. Whether this subset of people actually do 
get public support will also depend on the form of any financial means-test that also applies.   
The number of people who are FAC eligible (passed the needs test) can also be assessed as a 
proportion of the whole population with any ADL need. The result is shown in Table 15 and 
confirms that an eligibility-threshold form of needs test reduces access to public support among 
the low needs groups (this table excludes equipment only recipients).  
Table 15. Probability of access to care, 2010 – by ADL need, living alone and over 85 
 Not Alone Alone 
ADL need Less than 85 Over 85 Less than 85 Over 85 
1 0% 0% 2% 36% 
2 14% 43% 76% 99% 
3 65% 68% 100% 100% 
4 71% 74% 100% 100% 
5 81% 80% 100% 100% 
 
The amount of care assessed for FAC eligible recipients will vary according to their assessed 
need characteristics. Potential levels of care – before the application of the needs test and 
exclusions due to full informal care – are as given in Table 14 for community care and Table 13 
for care homes. Once these considerations are applied, the amount of public support for affected 
people (mainly low need people) drops to zero. Including hotel costs of care home placements 
and equipment costs, the total cost of supporting people who are FAC eligible i.e. after the needs 
test is just less than £14.1bn in 2010. Table 16 gives the break-down of the total and Table 17 
gives the average across the whole over 65 population (note that other needs factors also 
apply).  
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As a shorthand, we describe this amount care received by FAC eligible people as the normative 
package of care.  
Table 16. Total care-offer cost of care for FAC eligible people, 2010 –  
by ADL need, living alone and over 85 (£bn p.a.) 
 Not Alone Alone 
ADL need Less than 85 Over 85 Less than 85 Over 85 
1 0.15 0.00 0.66 0.31 
2 0.30 0.04 0.96 0.45 
3 0.42 0.09 0.85 0.48 
4 1.08 0.21 1.84 0.93 
5 1.14 0.54 2.20 1.42 
 
Table 17. Average potential cost of care for FAC eligible people, 2010 –  
by ADL need, living alone and over 85 (£s p.w.) 
 Not Alone Alone 
ADL need Less than 85 Over 85 Less than 85 Over 85 
1 4 1 35 72 
2 20 34 105 116 
3 59 63 154 146 
4 184 177 359 323 
5 299 297 455 417 
 
In the model, the normative level of care varies only with people’s need characteristics, 
including their receipt of informal care.2
To illustrate this, if we imagined a hypothetical financing system that levied zero charges on all 
people that are FAC eligible (i.e. passed the needs test) and where people have no desire to top-
up on their care offer, then eligible people would receive the benchmark normative care 
described in the above tables. The costs of the system would be £14.1bn for eligible people (and 
this cost would fall entirely on the public system). People that are not FAC eligible – because 
their needs fall below the need-test threshold might want to buy care privately, but would face 
the full costs themselves. So for non-FAC-eligible people we might see an additional private 
spend, but this amount would be additional to the £14.1bn public cost. 
 It comprises the determination as to whether people 
gain access to the system (i.e. are eligible for any support), what form of support (care home or 
other) and the level of support (over their lifetime). These processes are all conducted as part of 
the assessment and needs test. To re-iterate, these are potential amounts. The actual amount of 
support people get will also depend, not only on their needs, but also their financial 
circumstances as dictated by the financial means-test in operation in the care system. The model 
is designed to investigate different financial means-tests (i.e. different funding systems), holding 
the needs-test constant. So the starting point for the application of any funding system for care 
is that all people in the population receive the normative level of care according to the 
application of the same current needs-test. For example, we could assess the implications of 
moving to a free personal care model of funding (as used in Scotland) and the starting point 
would be the same.  
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Now if a different financial system were in place – one where FAC eligible people do face 
charges, then there is a chance that people would not want to take the full care offer – because 
they were unable or unwilling to pay for it. In this case, despite the same care offer for FAC 
eligible people (the £14.1bn), people would take less care. Indeed, under some systems, the 
financial rules may mean that FAC eligible people may not offered any public support – they pay 
the full costs of care. So although the offer is the same, the actual amount of care used by FAC 
eligible people would be different. Non-FAC-eligible people would operate in the same way as 
before, because they can only buy care outside the system (i.e. privately) anyway. 
The way that people respond to the charges they face in the model depends on the behavioural 
assumptions we make. These are outlined below in section 6. 
5.1 Altering the needs test 
The needs test outlined above is specified in the model to reflect current practice as far as 
possible. As will be described in what follows, when the current funding system is applied, the 
model produces results that correspond closely with current costs and utilisation.  
A central theme of the Wanless Review, nonetheless, is that this current assessment and needs-
testing practice may not be the best arrangement. Indeed, with an application of an outcomes-
based approach to assessment, the normative package of care changes quite significantly from 
its current form. Since we are concerned here with the implications of different funding 
systems, and that the same care requirement is used for the alternatives, the scale of the 
differences that result from different funding systems is not directly affected by the nature of 
the needs-test. It is important, however, to caveat that a change in the needs-test to those 
suggested in the Wanless Review would indirectly affect the funding system comparison results. 
5.1.1 Carer blind scenario 
The current needs test centrally recognises the level of informal care support that is available to 
people. Indeed, where informal care inputs are high, the (formal) care offer is low. This situation 
carries all sorts of assumptions about the willingness and ability of carers to provide this 
support. An option is to modify the needs test so that it is less dependent on carers; in other 
words to make the assessment rather more ‘blind’ to the current input of informal carers.  
In the model, simulating carer-blindness can be achieved by removing account of informal care 
when assessing FAC level. This will place people with informal care into the same FAC levels as 
people without informal care, other things equal. The more difficult part of configuring a carer-
blind system is in estimating how the number of people that currently have full levels of 
informal care – such that they do not receive any formal care – would change. People that 
actually approach social services but due to high levels of informal support are assessed as 
needing no formal care should now qualify for full formal care support. However, there will still 
be people that choose not to approach services, an option available to them because they have 
high levels of informal care. We make an assumption that effectively treats 70% of people with 
full informal care still choosing not to approach informal services (even though they would be 
assessed as needing formal care, although would likely face charges for that care). In other 
words, the model is not completely carer-blind; people with informal care are still likely to 
receive less formal support on average even though the difference is much reduced compared to 
the carer-sighted option.   
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Under the carer-blind option the number of people passing the needs test would be 1.6m, 
including people just receiving equipment, rather than 1.3m under the carer-sighted option 
above. 
When assessed as a proportion of the whole population with any ADL need, the difference 
between number of people who are FAC eligible and live alone and those that live with others is 
reduced – see Table 18.  
Table 18. Potential chance of access to care, 2010 – by ADL need, living alone and over 85 (carer-blind) 
 Not Alone Alone 
ADL need Less than 85 Over 85 Less than 85 Over 85 
1 7% 24% 7% 39% 
2 63% 69% 76% 99% 
3 92% 94% 100% 100% 
4 99% 98% 100% 100% 
5 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 19 gives the total potential cost of the carer-blind normative package, which increases 
from £14.1bn in 2010 to £16.7bn. The new averages are given in Table 20 and although not the 
same between the alone and not-alone groups are far closer than before.  
Table 19. Total potential cost of care for FAC eligible people, 2010 –  
by ADL need, living alone and over 85 (£bn p.a.) (carer-blind) 
 Not Alone Alone 
ADL need Less than 85 Over 85 Less than 85 Over 85 
1 0.46 0.06 0.70 0.31 
2 1.07 0.09 0.98 0.45 
3 0.86 0.18 0.86 0.49 
4 1.49 0.28 1.85 0.94 
5 1.37 0.66 2.20 1.42 
 
Table 20. Average potential cost of care for FAC eligible people, 2010 –  
by ADL need, living alone and over 85 (£s p.w.) 
 Not Alone Alone 
ADL need Less than 85 Over 85 Less than 85 Over 85 
1 13 28 36 73 
2 72 77 107 117 
3 119 120 157 147 
4 255 239 360 325 
5 360 363 455 417 
 
5.2 Lifetime risks and costs 
The cost implications of the current (carer-sighted) assessment and needs-test as estimated in 
the model were described in population cross-sectional terms above, that is, the cost of the 
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whole population in a given year (see Table 16). It is also useful to consider the expected cost of 
care at the normative level over a person’s remaining lifetime (i.e. before applying the financial 
means-test). This number is the sum of care costs for each year of life that a person is expected 
to live. We make this judgement for people at 65 years old.  
Table 21 reports the average risk of needing care and the cost over a person’s lifetime at 65. For 
example, 65 year old males have a 68% chance of potential (FAC eligible) need before they die. 
As indicated in section 3.2.2. this need is likely to occur in the last year or two of life. Females at 
65 would on average require £40,400 of care before they die, although the underlying 
distribution is highly skewed, with the mean cost pulled up by a very small number of very high 
cost cases. The median cost is £30,100.  
Table 21. lifetime expected risk of needing care and expected lifetime cost – at 65 years old 
 Probability of (FAC eligible) 
potential need 
Lifetime expected cost 
 Only recurring Recurring and 
equipment 
Mean Median 
Female 0.85 0.90 £40,400 £30,100 
Male 0.68 0.78 £22,300 £13,800 
All 0.76 0.84 £31,700 £21,400 
 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of costs for all 65 year olds in the model sample. A quarter or so 
have either zero cost or just an equipment cost need. The next 65% of the population have 
steadily rising costs. The last 10% have very high costs – mostly long-stay care home residents.  
 
Figure 9. Lifetime expected cost of care at 65 years (£s) 
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Lifetime costs for current 65 year olds are also relatively high because their care need develops 
a good way into the future (e.g. in 25 or more year’s time) by which time real unit cost inflation 
becomes very significant. We assume in the model a 2% real increase. This means, for example, 
that a £500 per week care home placement in 2010 will cost £820 per week in 35 years time in 
real terms (when a 65 year old would be 100 years). If we applied a 0% real cost inflation 
assumption, by contrast, the mean lifetime cost would fall from £31,700 to £21,100. 
Lifetime costs also change significantly with age. Older people are more likely to develop care 
needs in any given year but with a shorter life expectancy have fewer years left to experience 
this risk. Much will depend on the time at which care needs develop in the life course (i.e. how 
close to death). Figure 10 shows the distribution of lifetime costs by age group, with the top 
figure showing costs including real cost inflation and the bottom graph with zero cost inflation. 
The results suggest that care costs are concentrated in the final few years of life although the 
mean figures can get distorted by a small number of younger people experiencing very long 
lengths of stay. Older people are more likely to be already experiencing a care need and so will 
only have part of the length of stay to cost before they die. In other words, an 85 year old is 
likely to already have spent some time in receipt of care and so we are only counting the costs of 
care remaining in their life. 
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6 Behavioural assumptions 
People value care and support to different degrees. People with high levels of need will, as a 
rule, pay more to secure care than people with low levels of need. Rich people are generally 
willing and able to pay for more care than poorer people. Analysis of the English Longitudinal 
Survey of Ageing, as outlined in the Wanless Review, was used to give all people a set of 
preferences regarding how much they would pay privately for different levels of care, 
preferences that vary by their wealth and need characteristics. These preferences define a 
person’s demand functions for care i.e. the relationship between the amount of care people 
would demand for different charges. In the model we use a two-step demand process. People 
Including unit cost inflation 
Zero unit cost inflation 
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decide whether or not to buy care at all (given the charges they face). Then, if the system allows 
people the choice, people that wish to buy decide how much.  
The financial rules in operation in the care system will determine the relationship between the 
cost of a care package and the amount a person is charged for that package. To take a 
straightforward example, suppose the care system is purely private: that is,people face the full 
costs of care themselves. In other words, each £1 of care they buy costs them £1. This supply 
charge relationship can be mapped onto demand to give the amount that a person with given 
characteristics will buy privately (i.e. when demand at the given charge equals supply).  
Figure 11 illustrates the quantity- (step-two) demand functions used in the model. In this case, 
we distinguish between demand by people with high and low ADL need. In view of the difficulty 
in estimating these demand functions, we use simplified linear versions. In a private market, the 
average high need person would buy £112 of care per week (where the amount demanded 
equals the amount supplied). A low needs person would buy £75 worth of care.  
Figure 11. Demand and supply for care – private purchase, by need group 
   
The actual relationships in the model are more complex than the averages shown above. We 
assume a range of preferences (that vary with wealth and need). Figure 12 shows demand 
functions for the population divided into five quintiles according to strength of preference for 
care. Quintile 5 (Q5) people have the strongest preference (being the richest and highest need 
group) and would buy significantly more care than quintile 1 people, for example. 
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Figure 12. Demand for care – by need quintiles of strength of preference  
 
The shape of the supply curve in the model can be altered in order to simulate different 
financing rules in the care system. For example, if all people received a basic entitlement of £50 
per week without charge, and then faced the full cost of care, the supply curve in the above 
figures would be shifted to the right by £50.  
The size of uptake- (step-one) demand is given in Figure 13. Again, uptake demand varies by 
wealth and need.  
Figure 13. Demand for care – by need quintiles of strength of preference  
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For care homes, only uptake demand is relevant (people cannot buy a part of a care home 
place). There is also an associated housing component to the care given in a care home. Uptake 
demand for care homes takes the same form general form as uptake demand for community 
services, but only the care cost is taken into account. This assumption means that a person with 
identical characteristics would have the same chance of buying a £220 per week care package in 
the community as paying for the £220 care cost component in a care home.   
7 Unmet need 
The effects of charging (in the public or private systems) means that some people with a 
disability will not take-up formal care, or will take less care than if the charge was zero. How do 
we assess the implications of this situation? Clearly, people who take no formal care and have 
no informal care will have some level of ‘unmet’ need. But how much? Also, other people will 
respond to charges by buying less care than if the charge was zero. This behaviour might 
generate unmet need, depending on how drastic their response to charges is, and what the 
target for fully ‘met’ need is in terms of the amount of care they actually receive. There is also 
the issue of assessing how much informal care input people have and how far this reduces 
unmet need. There are many ways to approach these problems. The one taken in the model is as 
follows.  
• We assume the normative package of care (expressed as hours of care) is the target. As 
described, normative packages depend only on people’s needs-characteristics. 
• People who receive formal and informal care inputs that sum to equal or greater than the 
normative package of care have no unmet need.  
• People who have total inputs that fall short have unmet need equal to the shortfall. This 
includes people that have a need for a care home place but decide instead to take a 
community care place where the care hours are less than they would have received in a 
care home. 
Any ‘deficit’ approach to counting unmet need treats an hour’s worth of shortfall in a care 
package as equal whatever the needs level of the person in question. Potentially this could mean 
that a system that only failed to support low needs people (albeit a relatively large number since 
there are more low-needs people) could have more unmet need than a system that catered well 
for low needs people but failed significantly to meet the needs of high-needs people. We address 
this problem in the model by reducing the target level of support to zero for people with a FAC 
level of ‘low’ (or none) – see Table 12. Unmet need as so measured is therefore equal to zero for 
people with a low (or none) FAC level, regardless of the amount of care these people receive. 
This assumption means that our unmet need measure is likely to be an under-estimate of the 
actual total.  
Table 22 gives mean target hours per week (the normative package). People with a care home 
need have a target of 20 hours per week. Those in a care home have this need fully met; 
otherwise unmet need is the difference between the sum of care inputs (informal and formal) 
and the amount of the target.  
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Table 22. Target hours of (personal) care per week –  
by ADL need level 







Unmet need occurs because there are demand effects and actual use of services falls short of 
potential. We should also note that this concept of unmet need is based on the reference point of 
the normative care package, which is in turn based on current practice. As noted above, current 
practice may be seen as insufficient in which case actual unmet need would be higher than the 
measured level. 
8 Applying funding arrangements 
8.1 Current funding rules 
8.1.1 Social care 
Internationally, there are a wide range of financing arrangements for social care (OECD, 2005). 
England falls into the means-tested grouping – that is, where contributions to the system are 
mandated according to ability to pay, and where low income groups are subsidised with public 
funding through general taxation. In England, almost all public spending on social care is made 
via local councils, with funds allocated from general taxation and also raised through local 
(council) tax. The Government calculates a target total public budget for social care and this 
amount is passed to councils after netting off local tax revenue. Overall, the amount is budget-
constrained, i.e. not determined by actual demand, and generally derived in an incremental, 
rolled-forward way (Wanless et al., 2006). The criteria for calculating the total level of the 
public budget are not explicit. If demand turns out to be higher than the budget will support, 
councils have to make the needs test harsher (raise the FAC eligibility thresholds), which is 
what has been happening in recent years (Forder, 2007). 
The costs of long-term care can be divided into three components: a nursing care element; a 
personal care component that relates to a person’s ability to undertake activities of daily living; 
and a hotel/housing component, covering accommodation-related costs. In broad terms, 
nursing care is free at the point of use to service users in any setting after an assessment, be that 
a hospital or care home. Public support for all the other costs is means-tested with a possible 
charge levied on individuals.  
There are national rules for means testing of residential care support (Department of Health, 
2005). If the assessed person has (eligible) assets over a specified amount (the upper capital 
limit – £23,000 as of April 2009), they are liable for the full cost of the care home except for any 
eligible free nursing care. Eligible assets in this case include the person’s house as long as no 
spouse or other eligible dependent is living in that home. Anyone with total assets of less than 
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the upper capital limit will be asked to contribute all their weekly eligible income (including 
pension and other state benefits) less a ‘personal expenses allowance’ of around £20 a week, up 
to the cost of the placement. In addition, for people with assets above £14,000 (the lower capital 
limit), a ‘tariff income’ of £1 for every £250 between the upper and lower capital limits is 
assessed for the person on top of actual income. Since assets do not generally generate income 
at this rate, people have little choice but to draw down on those assets. The definitions of 
eligible incomes and assets are detailed and there are exceptions, but these tend to be minimal.  
The charging structure for non-residential social care services varies between the 150 local 
authorities in England, although there is national guidance that specifies the maximum 
contributions that people can be asked to make – the Fair Charging framework (Department of 
Health, 2003). Means-tested charges can be imposed for non-residential social care services 
including personal care, but councils are free to be more generous in their funding than the 
guidelines. There is variation in what is on offer. Some councils provide services free (although 
very few), others charge a flat rate, but most use a means-test that is based on the residential 
care means-test. In broad terms, assets can be assessed on the same basis as that for care 
homes. In this case, because the person remains living at home, their housing capital is exempt. 
People with capital below the upper limit can be asked to contribute an amount that leaves 
them with remaining income of at least 125% of the minimum amount of income they could 
secure from the Pension Credit system. Pension Credit tops up people’s income to make up any 
shortfall in their actual income and a ‘minimum guarantee’ amount. This guarantee credit 
currently stands at £130 per week for a single person and £198 per week per household for 
married people (the minimum is higher for people who are severely disabled or have caring 
responsibilities). Councils can also disregard a part of a person’s income on the basis that this 
income is needed to meet disability related costs (e.g. special diets, heating, laundry, etc..), 
generally when Attendance Allowance is also counted as income under the means-test.  
Older person with savings above the upper capital limit (£23,000) can be asked to pay the full 
charges (up to the costs of their care package), or more generally, are encouraged to make 
private arrangements. 
Charge income for non-residential care as a proportion of total care costs is much lower for 
councils than for care homes, but this is mainly due to the lack of hotel costs incurred in the care 
package (the housing costs of people receiving non-residential care could be met by housing 
benefit, but this does not fall on social care authorities). 
8.1.2 Disability-related benefits 
A number of social security benefits are available that provide people who have disabilities with 
extra income. The main rationale is that disability leads to additional living costs and/or lower 
earning potential. They are administered nationally as part of the Benefits System in the UK, 
providing additional income, not services, but are subject to a needs-test that is very similar to 
the needs-test for social care support. Attendance Allowance (AA) is available for people over 
65 who have disabilities. The closely related Disability Living Allowance (DLA) is for younger 
disabled people but recipients who turn 65 keep DLA rather than switching to AA. These two 
benefits are universal i.e. not financially means-tested. Rates per week vary by severity of 
disability bands, but top rates are about £70 per week for AA and DLA (care) as of 2009. The 
lower rate for AA is £47 per week, which is about the same as the middle rate for DLA (care). 
The lower rate for DLA (care) is just under £20 per week.  
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People receiving public social care support at home continue to be entitled to AA/DLA, but 
people in publicly supported care home placements lose their entitlement. Self-payers in care 
homes retain entitlement. 
Receipt of AA or DLA may also provide further entitlement for means-tested Pension Credit, 
where a severe disability premium of about £50 per week is added to the minimum guarantee 
credit (but not if people live with a non-disabled person). 
Where a person is receiving substantial levels of informal care (a carer is providing more than 
35 hours per week), the carer might also be eligible for Carers Allowance of around £50 per 
week. The actual amount is reduced by the amount of certain other benefits, including State 
Pension. Also, this is a taxable benefit. 
Further details are provided below, but AA expenditure is around £3.7bn at present and DLA 
(Care) for over 65s is around £1.1bn per annum. Together they run to three-quarters of the net 
amount of public social care spending (and more adding severe disability premium and carers 
allowance), highlighting the significance of these benefits. The care and benefits systems are 
independently operated even though they support the same section of the population. This 
raises questions about coherence and best-value in the use of public resources, issues addressed 
in section 9.4 below. 
8.2 The care offer under means-testing 
When interpreted for purposes of modelling, the fair access to care rules are the needs test. The 
fair charging rules (for non-residential care) and the charging for residential accommodation 
guide (CRAG) rules are the financial test. The former limits access to only high need people (FAC 
eligible), who would get the normative level of support. The latter rules limit access to public 
support to less wealthy people. Together, these tests create a care offer under the current 
system. This offer can come with charges and so actual uptake depends on how people respond 
to those charges. 
8.2.1 Publicly supported demand and top-up 
Generally speaking, the financial means-test restricts support to people below the asset ceiling. 
These people are offered an amount of care depending on the needs-test, and for those who are 
FAC this amount is equal the normative package as described above. The charges for this care 
are determined by the financial rules of the public system. Because the quantity of support is 
determined in the system, quantity demand considerations do not apply. Only uptake demand is 
tested relative to the public system charge i.e. if people find these charges to be too high, then 
some will opt out.  
People that accept the public system offer (and its charges) can also top-up their care by buying 
additional support privately. In this case both quantity- and uptake- demand applies to the top-
up component, but where the size of demand at any given price is scaled to reflect the amount of 
care they already receive through the public system. So if the public system is very generous, 
the amount of top-up care sought is correspondingly small, and vice versa. 
8.2.2 Private demand 
People who are not eligible for public support (due to failure of the needs test or the financial 
means-test) can buy care privately using the same demand functions but these people face the 
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full costs of care. Compared with people in the public system, higher prices (i.e. without any 
public subsidy to lower the charge), should mean lower demand. However, if they are excluded 
on financial grounds, the counteracting effect of wealthy people having greater ability to pay, 
means that private-pay service use need not be lower than publicly-supported service use.  
The assumptions made about demand lead to a relatively skewed purchase of care privately by 
people not eligible for support under the current means-tested system. Figure 14 shows the 
amount of care bought by non-eligible people in 2010. A good proportion decide not to seek any 
formal care as shown by the cut-off (and so rely on informal care or manage without support). 




The model applies the assessment, needs-test, financial tests, behavioural response and so on to 
people in the sample to determine the costs and charges of the current means-testing funding 
(MT) model in the following categories. 
Net public cost Cost to PSS public funds net of point of need charges 
AA spend Attendance Allowance expenditure 
Scheme charges Charges made to the scheme at point of need (PoN) 
Scheme hotel charges Amount of PoN charges to cover hotel costs 
Scheme care charges Amount of PoN charges to cover care costs 
Scheme top-up charges Private payments made by service users in the scheme to buy 
private care beyond that provided by the scheme 
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Non scheme charges Payments made by people not in the scheme 
Non scheme hotel charges Non-scheme payments to cover hotel costs 
Non scheme care charges Non-scheme payments to cover care costs 
Total private spend Total private expenditure: non-scheme payments plus top-up 
payments 
Total social care spend Total expenditure: net public plus total private plus scheme 
charges (subject to rounding errors) 
This does not include AA spending 
For means-testing ‘scheme’ refers to people who qualify for any council (public) support. Non-
scheme people are those that buy care privately and pay from their own resources.  
Table 23 reports costs and charges. In this (and all other such tables) total spend is the sum of 
net public spend, scheme charges and private payments (the latter being the sum of scheme top-
up charges and non-scheme charges). It does not include the spend on Attendance Allowance. 
The increasing spending requirements are shown in Figure 15. Over the period 2009 to 2026, 
net public expenditure would need to increase by 4% p.a. in real terms in order to maintain the 
current support offer to all people with needs above the current eligibility threshold into the 
future. As with any projection, changing the underlying assumptions will change the results. For 
example, councils could further increase eligibility thresholds in the future and this would 
reduce the growth in net public cost, but at the same time would create more unmet need. 



































2010 6.3 3.7 1.8 1.3 0.4 0.6 4.7 1.9 2.8 5.3 13.3 
2011 6.6 3.8 1.9 1.5 0.4 0.6 4.5 1.8 2.7 5.1 13.7 
2012 7.1 3.8 2 1.5 0.4 0.7 4.8 1.9 2.9 5.5 14.5 
2013 7.3 3.9 2.1 1.6 0.5 0.7 5 2 3 5.8 15.2 
2014 7.7 4 2.2 1.7 0.5 0.7 5.3 2.1 3.2 6 15.8 
2015 8 4.1 2.3 1.8 0.5 0.8 5.2 2 3.1 6 16.3 
2016 8.4 4.1 2.4 1.9 0.5 0.9 5.3 2.1 3.2 6.2 17 
2017 8.5 4.1 2.5 1.9 0.6 0.9 5.9 2.4 3.6 6.8 17.8 
2018 9 4.1 2.5 2 0.5 0.8 6.2 2.5 3.7 7.1 18.6 
2019 9.2 4.2 2.6 2 0.5 1 6.5 2.6 3.9 7.5 19.3 
2020 9.5 4.3 2.6 2.1 0.5 1 7.1 2.9 4.2 8.1 20.3 
2021 10.1 4.4 2.8 2.2 0.6 1.1 7.3 2.9 4.4 8.4 21.4 
2022 10.4 4.5 2.9 2.3 0.6 1.2 7.8 3.2 4.6 9 22.4 
2023 10.7 4.6 3 2.3 0.7 1.3 7.9 3.2 4.7 9.2 22.9 
2024 11.3 4.7 3.2 2.5 0.7 1.4 8.2 3.3 4.9 9.6 24 
2025 11.7 4.9 3.3 2.6 0.8 1.6 8.5 3.4 5.1 10 25.1 
2026 12.1 5.1 3.4 2.6 0.8 1.7 9.3 3.8 5.5 11 26.4 
PSSRU Discussion Paper 2644  37 
The figure below shows that private spending is projected to increase proportionately faster 
than net public spend. This follows from our base assumption that successive cohorts of older 
people will be wealthier in real terms coupled with the assumption that the wealth test in the 
MT model does not change in real terms (although Pension Credit is up-rated in line with 
earnings). This implies an increase in the proportion of non-scheme i.e. privately funded people 
in the future. Reduced public spending is also consistent with a relative increase in unmet need 
as more people defer care where they face the full point of need cost. The ‘budget’ line in the 
figure is the 2007 PSS spend (£5.8bn) up-rated at 2% real. Unreformed AA (plus DLA) spend 
also increases, broadly in line with the growth in dependent population. 
Figure 15. Projection of costs under Means-testing–base case assumptions 
 
The move from a carer-sighted to a carer-blind offer is modelled to begin in 2014/15. The 
impact is mainly on the spend on non-residential care. Overall – as shown in Table 24 – net 
public cost increases by around 25%. 
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2015 9.9 4.1 2.6 1.8 0.8 0.8 5.1 2 3.1 5.9 18.4 
2016 10.4 4.1 2.7 1.9 0.8 0.8 5.3 2.1 3.2 6.1 19.1 
2017 10.5 4.1 2.8 1.9 0.9 0.8 5.9 2.4 3.5 6.8 20.1 
2018 11.1 4.1 2.8 2 0.8 0.8 6.1 2.5 3.6 6.9 20.9 
2019 11.5 4.2 2.9 2 0.9 1 6.5 2.6 3.9 7.4 21.8 
2020 11.9 4.3 3 2.1 0.9 1 7.1 2.9 4.2 8.1 23 
2021 12.5 4.5 3.2 2.2 0.9 1.1 7.2 2.9 4.3 8.3 24 
2022 12.9 4.5 3.3 2.3 1 1.2 7.8 3.2 4.6 8.9 25.2 
2023 13.3 4.6 3.4 2.3 1.1 1.3 7.9 3.2 4.7 9.2 25.9 
2024 13.9 4.8 3.5 2.5 1.1 1.4 8.2 3.3 4.9 9.6 26.9 
2025 14.5 4.9 3.7 2.6 1.2 1.6 8.4 3.4 5 10 28.2 
2026 15 5.1 3.9 2.7 1.2 1.7 9.2 3.7 5.4 10.8 29.7 
 
8.4 Unmet need 
Table 25 reports levels of unmet need as defined in section 7 above. The table gives the results 
in terms of millions of hours per annum and numbers of people with unmet need. Figure 16 
below shows that despite the increase in expenditure, the current service offer is also consistent 
with an increase in total hours of unmet need. This occurs even though the average level of 
unmet need per person is constant through time because there are more older people with care 
needs. 
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Table 25. Unmet need – MT unreformed AA, carer-sighted 
Year Unmet need 
inc. informal 
care 
(hours (m) p.a.) 











(hours (m) p.a.) 
Proportion 
unmet need re. 
normative 
input 
2010 111 0.3 3.7 218 27% 
2011 111 0.3 3.6 227 28% 
2012 116 0.3 3.8 233 28% 
2013 115 0.3 3.6 236 27% 
2014 118 0.3 3.8 242 28% 
2015 122 0.3 3.8 254 28% 
2016 122 0.3 3.8 264 29% 
2017 122 0.3 3.8 267 28% 
2018 129 0.3 3.8 279 29% 
2019 133 0.3 3.9 291 29% 
2020 132 0.3 4.0 296 29% 
2021 141 0.3 3.9 306 29% 
2022 141 0.3 4.0 309 29% 
2023 154 0.3 4.2 334 30% 
2024 155 0.4 4.0 336 30% 
2025 157 0.4 4.1 342 29% 
2026 157 0.4 4.1 342 29% 
 
Figure 16. Projection of unmet need hours (including informal care) – MT base case assumptions 
 
Unmet need is inversely proportional to the total spend on formal services (not the public 
spend).  
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8.5 Recipients 
The number of people receiving services under the current funding system is given in Table 26. 
Under this system there are a significant number of people that purchase care privately because 
they are not eligible for scheme support. In addition to these people, there are those individuals 
with some care need that are not eligible and choose not to buy care themselves – these are 
non-services users with some need in the table. Many people with low levels of need also make 
do without formal services and some high needs people enjoy high levels of informal care so 
that they do not need (or want!) to approach formal services. In addition, under MT, demand 
effects mean that some higher need people forgo or delay service uptake (and so experience 
unmet need as outlined above). Together, these people make up the third column of the body of 
the table. The three columns sum up to the total number of people with any level of measurable 
need.  
Table 26. Numbers of people – MT carer-sighted 






with some need 
(millions) 
Number of people 
with some need 
(millions) 
2010 0.88 0.29 0.82 1.99 
2011 0.9 0.29 0.83 2.03 
2012 0.91 0.29 0.89 2.09 
2013 0.94 0.3 0.91 2.15 
2014 0.95 0.31 0.93 2.19 
2015 0.96 0.31 0.99 2.26 
2016 1 0.3 0.99 2.3 
2017 1 0.33 1.02 2.36 
2018 1.03 0.34 1.03 2.4 
2019 1.04 0.35 1.06 2.45 
2020 1.05 0.36 1.11 2.52 
2021 1.1 0.37 1.12 2.59 
2022 1.11 0.39 1.17 2.67 
2023 1.13 0.38 1.2 2.71 
2024 1.15 0.4 1.21 2.76 
2025 1.16 0.41 1.25 2.82 
2026 1.17 0.43 1.28 2.88 
 
8.6 Spend-down 
An important criterion in judging alternative funding systems is how they impact on people’s 
ability to pay, and in particular, the degree to which people can pay care charges out of income 
or whether they have to draw on assets/savings.  
Care charges are clearly not the only call on people’s income. We therefore subtract a cost of 
living amount from people’s net income to determine their residual income. The cost of living 
amount is equal to the minimum income guarantee of pension credit for people living in the 
community. For people in care homes, this amount is set equal to the personal allowance (in 
that most living costs are covered by the home). Also subtracted is the person’s point of need 
care charge (including hotel costs for residential care). Pension credit should ensure that 
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people’s imputed income is at least equal to the minimum guarantee. However, this benefit also 
assesses an income stream from assets so actual income can fall short of the minimum. On the 
basis of this analysis, around 8.5% of the general population without care needs draw on assets 
in any given year.  
To assess the effects of care charges on spend-down risk we need to look at the profile of 
expenditure through time. The analysis looks at the implications for people receiving services in 
2014/15 in two groups: (a) those people that are in care homes at this time and thereafter for 
their lifetime and (b) those people that are non-residential service users and at no time before 
their death go into a care home. This distinction is made because spend-down rates are 
expected to be much higher in care homes3
Table 27
.   
 gives details of the amount that service users in 2014/15 have to draw on assets (i.e. 
have negative residual income) over the period 2015 to death or to 2026, whichever comes first. 
The table reports the amount of spend-down that results directly from paying care charges, as 
distinct from any spend-down the person might have incurred regardless of care charges. For 
example, of people that were residential care service users in 2015 under MT, the average care-
related spend-down averages £10,000 over the period. Furthermore, we only consider charges 
associated with the normative package i.e. that amount of care a person ought to have to avoid 
unmet need. Some people will buy more care than this amount and so draw down assets faster 
than that suggested in the table. Also, these are people that are service users in 2014/15; they 
may have been service users in previous years and so have already drawn-down on some assets. 
This analysis does not compute lifetime actual spend-down of assets. 
We distinguish between people that are entitled to state support under MT at the point in time 
where changes would be implemented and those that are not.4
For this group of care home residents in 2015, median lengths of stay are 1 year, although with 
a long-tail, the average length of stay is 2 years. Non-residential care spend-down is much lower, 
mainly because charges are much lower, even for non-supported people. 
 The latter people bear the full 
care and hotel costs and typically find their income to be £200 p.w. short of care home charges. 
Those people that are entitled average less than a £2 p.w. shortfall (although this is on the 
assumption that they only need £20 p.w. personal allowance to cover non-care costs of living in 
a care home). As a result, over their lifetime in care homes they spend-down only a few hundred 
pounds.  
Table 27. Spend-down characteristics – MT carer-sighted  

























of assets  
(£b p.a.) 
Not MT entitled 0.99 -30.5 -3.8 0.18 -0.8 -0.1 
MT entitled 0.12 -0.1 >-0.1 0.01 0 >-0.1 
All 0.40 -10 -3.8 0.06 -0.3 -0.1 
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9 Assessing the current system 
The main strengths of the current system are also to some extent its weaknesses. The MT 
system provides publicly funded support towards the costs of care for people on the basis of an 
asset and incomes (or wealth) test as outlined. This means that low wealth groups who would 
otherwise be unable to pay for care are able to receive the care they need to meet their needs 
(at least within the framework of the needs test inherent in the current system). It also means 
that the tax payer is not paying for wealthier people that would otherwise pay for care 
themselves. The direct implication is that a means-tested system is one of the cheapest on the 
public purse. 
The weaknesses largely arise because the public help people receive only extends for a limited 
way up the wealth distribution, and tapers off very rapidly, leaving moderately wealthy people 
with very little public help and very modest opportunities to insure against the financial and 
other risks of needing care. There are particular issues to this argument.  
First, the system is selective; only poorer people get any help. Like all such safety net systems, 
this selectivity can be divisive in a population characterised by significant wealth inequality. 
One of the key strengths of the NHS, by contrast, is its universalistic nature. With essentially a 
‘poor law’ underpinning, the stigma in having to go cap-in-hand to social services is self-
evidently large. Many people for this reason alone would avoid seeking support and muddle 
through (or not) on their own. 
Second, because care can be very expensive for people with high needs, even the relatively 
wealthy and especially those just above the wealth threshold, may find affordability to be a real 
problem. Faced with the full costs of care, these people defer or delay buying care privately or 
are forced to draw on limited savings. The particular problem is the discontinuities in the 
system. Being below or above the threshold is only a difference of a few pounds but the cost 
implications in terms of the charges individuals face can be huge. Where people are able to 
secure less care they may experience unmet need.  
Third, the concern is not only with the size of the costs involved but also the significant 
uncertainty that exists for individuals; some people will need next to no care in their lives, 
others might need hundreds of thousands of pounds of care. There is a safety net that protects 
the last £14,000 of capital but this will be of little comfort to the average home owner that has 
had to use 90% of their savings and assets, for example.  
Fourth, a more general problem with means-testing arises in the form of the fairness and 
incentive issues. People that make financial provision for their old age through prudence and 
hard work, so the argument goes, are penalised compared to less careful people who get help 
from the public purse. Some people will deliberately (but not illegally) divest of assets in order 
to qualify for means-tested support.  
We might also argue that wealthier people pay more in taxation anyway, so they are doubly 
penalised. This is, however, a public finance issue relating to re-distribution of wealth in society 
and in this sense has a limited bearing on the (relatively very modest) spend of public money on 
social care. 
PSSRU Discussion Paper 2644  43 
Fifth, means-testing is complex and potentially open to misinterpretation or even outright 
fraud. In practice, political realities may mean that means-testing is not completely avoidable, 
but it could be made more coherent and consistent. 
These issues relate to the social care system. The help that people receive through the benefits 
system (e.g. as Attendance Allowance) suffers far less from some of the above problems. When 
considered alongside the social care system, however, concerns arise about whether this 
expenditure is good value for money. The stringency of both the needs-test and the means-test 
in social care mean that relatively few people get help and many people with not insignificant 
levels of need are left without public support. At the same time, AA provides a little support to a 
great many more people, some of whom are very wealthy anyway, and others (self-) report very 
low levels of disability – see section 4.1. Both groups would be very unlikely to be eligible for 
social care support. Again, this means that medium needs and medium wealth people lose out, 
comparatively speaking. 
9.1 Distribution of net payout at the point of need and distribution of 
charges 
The net amount of support people receive from the MT system can be measured as the cost 
value of their care package less the charges they have to pay. Publicly supported people 
generally pay less than the cost of their care and so are net beneficiaries. Purely private payers 
meet the full costs of care; their net support is zero. Being a means-tested system that 
determines eligibility on the basis of wealth we would expect the net amount of public support 
to be negatively correlated with wealth. This is indeed the case, as illustrated by results 
reported in Table 28. The table shows the pound value of care less charge over the period 
2014/15 until 2025/26 for people receiving care in 2014/15. People in the highest two 
quintiles (4 and 5) receive considerably less support than people in lower quintiles.    
Table 28. Net public support for service users in 2014/15 until 2025/26  
– total by wealth quintile  
Wealth 
quintile 
Net support (£s) 
Care homes Community-base 
Mean Median Mean Median 
1 63900 25300 10500 6200 
2 49200 23900 13300 8100 
3 34900 21100 12000 6600 
4 20500 16900 4800 200 
5 5300 0 400 0 
All 36300 21100 7800 1100 
 
Taken in isolation these results are far from conclusive, however. Higher wealth people can 
afford to pay for care privately, so what is important is how much support they actually secure. 
In addition, because people might be inclined to top-up their care, it is perhaps more telling to 
look at whether they have unmet need rather than how much public support they receive.  
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9.2 Distribution of unmet need   
Figure 17 shows mean levels of unmet need by wealth quintile. The chart shows that quintiles 4 
and 3 have the highest levels, with quintiles 5 and 2 in the middle, and quintile 1 with the lowest 
levels. These results underpin the arguments that middle wealth people that are above the 
assets ceiling under mean-testing are the worst affected group because they face relatively high 
charges for care, but do not have the relatively unlimited ability to pay that quintile 5 people 
possess.    
Figure 17. Unmet need – hours per week per 1000 population, by wealth quintile 
 
9.3 Distribution of spend-down 
The financial burden people are exposed to is also an important consideration. Even where 
people are able to secure enough care to meet their needs, if in the process they are financially 
impoverished this too is a highly negative outcome. This is also the question of how much risk is 
borne by individual people. If people are exposed to a very real possibility of losing most of their 
savings, even in practice they are lucky enough not to develop a high care need, this is still a 
major concern and an unattractive characteristic of the system. 
In other words, we might expect richer people to draw on their assets – even though there are 
issues of fairness as outlined – but it would seem reasonable that this occurs in a proportionate 
way.   
The following tables report estimates from the model of the extent to which people are forced to 
draw on savings and other assets as a result of the current system. In other words, are care 
charges they face greater than that which could be met from their current income less relevant 
living costs – see section 8.6. Spend-down is much greater for people in care homes and also, 
other things equal, for higher wealth quintiles. The tables also include figures for the range of 
likely spend-down levels (the median and also the people at the 5th percentile of the 
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distribution). Again high wealth quintiles could face very high levels of spend-down if they are 
unlucky enough to be in the 5th percentile of the distribution.  
Table 29. Spend-down of people in care homes in 2014/15 – by wealth quintile, total spend-down for period 












 % Mean Median 5%-tile % Mean 
1 20 -£3,200 £0 -£23,500 91 -£15,700 
2 32 -£5,700 £0 -£23,800 80 -£17,800 
3 46 -£10,800 £0 -£41,800 62 -£23,200 
4 50 -£12,700 £0 -£62,600 56 -£25,600 
5 82 -£30,800 -£13,400 -£123,600 17 -£37,600 
All 44 -£11,300 £0 -£55,700 65 -£25,800 
 
Table 30. Spend-down of people with community packages in 2014/15 – by wealth quintile, total spend-down 












 % Mean Median 5%-tile % Mean 
1 8 -£300 £0 -£500 92 -£3,400 
2 5 -£200 £0 £0 89 -£4,100 
3 6 -£400 £0 -£1,500 80 -£7,400 
4 10 -£400 £0 -£2,100 58 -£3,600 
5 4 -£200 £0 £0 21 -£3,800 
All 7 -£300 £0 -£800 66 -£4,300 
 
For community-based care, the highest wealth quintiles spend-down less than the middle 
quintiles because their income is large enough to meet the more modest care charges for these 
services. Table 31 and Table 32 give spend-down amounts as a proportion of total wealth 
(housing and non-housing). For both care homes and community-based services, it is the middle 
quintiles that lose the greatest proportion of their wealth.  
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Table 31. Spend-down of people in care homes in 2014/15– by wealth quintile, total spend-down for period 








Wealth Spend-down as 
percentage of… 
 Mean Mean Mean Income Wealth 
1 -£3,200 £127 33000 -48 -10 
2 -£5,700 £180 36000 -61 -16 
3 -£10,800 £243 56000 -86 -19 
4 -£12,700 £318 79000 -77 -16 
5 -£30,800 £671 223000 -88 -14 
All -£11,300 £281 74000 -77 -15 
 
Table 32. Spend-down of people with community packages in 2014/15 – by wealth quintile, total spend-down 








Wealth Spend-down as 
percentage of 
 Mean Mean Mean Income Wealth 
1 -£300 £123 63000 -5 -0.5 
2 -£200 £181 64000 -2 -0.3 
3 -£400 £238 83000 -3 -0.5 
4 -£400 £325 130000 -2 -0.3 
5 -£200 £701 306000 -1 -0.1 
All -£300 £332 137000 -2 -0.2 
 
Overall, taking net benefits, unmet need and spend-down into account, the means-tested model 
produces the worst results for middle wealth people – those people, in other words, who are 
mostly above the means-test threshold but do not have high levels of income and savings 
compared to the richest people in the population.  
9.4 Reforming AA 
In order to investigate the inter-relationships between the use of social care under the means-
tested system and expenditure on AA, we can use the model to simulate the cost implications of 
both (a) removing AA entitlement from wealthier people i.e. those unlikely to be eligible for 
social care as a result of the financial means-test and (b) those people already in receipt of social 
care. The latter in particular would be consistent with the idea of a unified (or at least more 
coherent) system where people did not simultaneously receive both forms of support. The 
overall savings to the public purse would then be available for re-allocation (presumably within 
the context of a unified system) on more coherent criteria. Here we are interested in the size of 
the cost saving and leave the implications of re-allocation to further analysis. 
Our starting point for the analysis is current uptake of AA (we leave DLA uptake unchanged). 
We assume that the above ‘reform’ applies only to new potential claimants after 2014. People in 
receipt at 2014 continue in receipt until they die (or lose entitlement under the current rules 
e.g. by going into a supported care home place). Therefore, there are no actual (money) losers. 
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People that we would predict to newly claim after 2014 who are in the top three quintiles of the 
wealth distribution lose entitlement. Those people who would be in receipt of social care 
support also lose entitlement.  
This reform would free up significant resources as shown by Figure 18. Transitional protection 
of recipients at 2014 means that the total savings begin to mount only after these recipients 
have died. The trend for reformed AA spend therefore falls initially and then flattens out (and 
then would being to climb again). Freed-up public funding (the difference between trends) 
reaches about £3.5bn by 2026. This is a substantial resource that could be re-directed. Any 
assessment of whether this money ought to be re-directed would have to weigh the 
disadvantages (of those that would lose AA theoretically) against the advantages (which would 
depend on exactly how the money was used).   
Figure 18. AA reform under means-testing 
 
10 Concluding points  
The care and support Green Paper will consider the reform of funding arrangements for social 
care. To make judgements about alternative funding arrangements we need to consider the 
change in the cost (to the public purse and to the individual) and outcomes of the system for 
stakeholders. We also need to know the distribution of these cost and outcome changes to 
assess who stands to gain and who to lose out. A dynamic micro-simulation (DMS) approach can 
provide this analysis, taking an actual (sampled) population and simulating how people would 
respond to different social care systems.  
The PSSRU DMS model uses the British Household Panel Survey. It determines people’s needs 
and wealth/income and combines this with individual characteristics data for each person in 
the BHPS sample. Potential use of care and support is them calculated based on need and other 
characteristics. To reflect overall budget constraints for public support, the model applies a 
needs-test to mirror the application of needs-eligibility criteria used by Councils with Social 
Services Responsibilities (CSSRs). In this process individuals that are eligible on needs grounds 
receive a potential level of support (the ‘normative’ level). Actual use of services then depends 
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on the financial rules that are in place and how people respond to any charge that would be 
levied upon them. Under the current means-tested funding system, only people with eligible 
assets below an asset ceiling are eligible for public support, and even then are usually required 
to pay a charge. Those not eligible will have to self-pay the whole cost. Some people are 
unwilling or unable to meet the charges and so defer the use of formal care services. The model 
calculates on this basis the level of public and private expenditure on care. It also produces 
estimates of recipient numbers by type of care and consequences such as: the level of ‘unmet’ 
need; how much people pay over their lifetime, potentially spending-down of assets. It can also 
estimate which people are winners and who are losers of any funding reform.  
The model produces estimates based on the data and a range of assumptions about need, 
potential service use, demand responses, informal care rates etc. These assumptions are either 
set a priori e.g. that unit costs will increase by 2% in real terms, or are based on relevant 
analysis e.g. demand responses. In all cases, changing the assumptions will change the results, 
which underlines that the model makes projections based on assumptions, not predictions.  
The DMS model is designed primarily to consider the effects of changing the financial system 
(although it is not limited to just this analysis). The starting point is to assume the same 
potential level of support as in the current system (i.e. a level of assessed care requirement and 
needs-tested eligibility as based on the current system). This assumption means that applying 
the current financial arrangements will result in the model producing the same actual service 
use as we see now. There is no particular reason, however, to assume that this assessment and 
needs-test are appropriate. The Wanless Review, for example, suggested a quite different needs-
test based on cost-effective achievement of outcomes. 
On the basis of plausible assumptions made about cost growth (2% real) and demographic 
change (Government principle population projections and constant prevalence of disability), 
public funding would need to increase by over 90% in real terms between 2009/10 and 
2025/26. This is equivalent to around 4% per annum in real terms. Private spending would 
increase at a faster rate. These increases would be required to maintain the current care offer 
per person i.e. for a needs- and financially eligible person in 2026 facing the same charges to 
receive the same amount of support as that person would in 2010.   
The means-tested funding model provides public support to people with assessable wealth that 
falls below a specified ceiling (currently £23,000 of assets). Charges are levied to those below 
the ceiling and people above have to self-pay. The system therefore protects the poorest and 
most needy people, but the very rapid tapering-off of support leaves problems for people above 
the asset ceiling, and people with moderate levels of need, creating unmet need in these groups. 
The system is also unfair on people that save and it is stigmatising and open to fraud. It is in 
stark contrast with universal access philosophy of the NHS. People above the asset ceiling – i.e. 
who have savings but would not be regarded as particularly wealthy by many – are more likely 
to experience disproportionately high levels of unmet need and more rapid draw-down of 
assets, according to the model.  
Attendance Allowance and Disability Living Allowance are explicitly modelled in this work. 
These benefits are aimed at the same disabled population that can also benefit from social care 
support, but the two systems are independently operated. A greater overall coherence could be 
achieved by consolidating these disability-related benefits with the social care system. Model 
PSSRU Discussion Paper 2644  49 
analysis suggests that a significant amount of AA expenditure goes to people that are either in 
the top three wealth quintiles or that already receive council funded social care. There also 
appears to be a not insignificant AA expenditure going to people with very low levels of need. 
Overall, the DMS model can help in decision-making about possible re-configuration or re-
allocation of resources between these benefits and social care. 
The model is designed to consider alternative funding arrangements and in particular to 
compare new funding arrangements with the current system. The model will start with the 
same potential care requirement and the same set of people. It will assess how costs and 
outcomes would be projected to change under the new system with respect to what they would 
have been if the current system continued. Subsequent reports will describe these analyses. 
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12 Notes 
 
1 The characteristics of people at waves 3 to 15 were inflated as relevant to make all data consistent with 
base year (2006/7) prices. Pooling in this way means treating the same person appearing in different 
waves as a different person at the base year. Since people’s situation changes through time and because 
there is a large turnover in the BHPS, this was seen as a reasonable step to give a large sample size. 
Turnover is significant in people over 65 in the BHPS. Of the 29,986 people in the pooled sample, only 
5876 were present in all waves 3 to 15. 
2 Keeping this normative level invariant in this way is very useful when making comparisons between 
funding arrangements because it removes a potential source of difference and simplifies the assessment. 
3 The philosophy of the current care system is that people who move permanently in care homes are 
assumed to sell any housing assets and use some of this resource to cover hotel cost/rent in care homes 
4 We exclude the very small number of people that start as MT entitled but become not eligible for state 
funding subsequently. We wish only to compare people that are always entitled or always not entitled. 
